After the October 7 attacks by Hamas, Israel first expanded its military operations in Palestine and later targeted Hezbollah in Lebanon. These attacks eventually extended to Iran, which supports these forces, in what has been described as a “12-day war.” During these twelve days, Iranian nuclear facilities were targeted. On February 28, the attacks evolved into joint operations conducted by Israel and the United States. After 13 days of continued strikes, the objective of toppling the Iranian regime has not been achieved. Both sides, however, have signaled that the attacks will continue until their strategic goals are reached.

 

Dr. Seevan Saeed—who has taught at Rojava University, Shaanxi Normal University in China, and the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom—answered questions from Mezopotamya Agency (MA) regarding the ongoing attacks. 

 

US President Donald Trump has suggested that the war may be nearing its end. How do you interpret these statements at this stage? 

 

We should analyze this from two different perspectives. The first concerns Trump and those around him—in other words, state officials and other governments aligned with the United States. The second perspective is that of the Iranian regime. Before these attacks began, many of us believed that war might not actually occur, because negotiations were actively taking place and the Iranian state appeared ready to make certain concessions. Yet, in the middle of these talks, the attacks suddenly began. When Trump initially launched the attacks, he suggested the conflict would be short-lived, possibly ending within four or five weeks. However, due to the sharp rise in oil prices, which has placed a heavy burden on the United States, he is now signaling that the war might stop. He does not want disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, particularly to shipping routes bringing goods and oil toward Iraq. At the same time, he wants to present a political success to the public. But ending the war today does not depend solely on Trump. Two other actors are crucial. One is Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, who has recently assumed leadership in Iran after his father Ali Khamenei and much of his family were reportedly killed by Israel and the United States. It remains unclear what kind of political direction he will pursue. The second actor is Israel. Even if the United States wanted the attacks to stop, Israel would likely oppose such a move. Similarly, several Arab states do not favor ending the attacks in their current form. They fear that if the Iranian regime survives, it could emerge stronger than before.

 

If the regime does not collapse, what might the populations inside Iran—such as the Baloch, Kurds, and Persians—face? If the United States withdraws, will major global powers avoid Iran for another century?

 

If you had asked me yesterday, I would have said the regime would definitely fall. However, overnight, a phone call from Putin and Netanyahu to Trump reportedly pushed the United States back toward negotiations. The reason is simple: oil prices surged dramatically during this period. Maintaining Israel’s security is a central issue here, as is the security of Gulf states. At the same time, there is no clear alternative leadership inside Iran. In this context, the 10-million-strong Kurdish population represents the only group with organized political structures, representation, and experience. Kurdish political parties exist, and they have both social and political foundations. However, this alone is not sufficient. Even if the regime remains in place but local populations manage to gain certain rights, Iran would still need at least 20 years to recover. Another scenario is that the regime does not fall but becomes significantly weakened, while all regional populations rise up against it. In that case, there is also the risk of large-scale massacres. Trump portrays himself in this context almost like a messianic figure, claiming he can bring democracy to Iran while preventing economic damage. Yet the United States itself is facing serious domestic challenges.

 

What is Iran’s strategy right now? Does it want the war to continue or expand across the region?

 

For Iran, the greatest success at the moment is simply preventing the regime from collapsing. Even if other powers continue heavy aerial bombardment, they know that without a ground invasion, the regime is unlikely to fall. Therefore, even a simple cessation of hostilities would be considered a major success for the regime. Iran understands the importance of maintaining the appearance of resilience. Afterward, it would likely seek to rebuild and expand its military capabilities, potentially preparing for future confrontation with its longstanding rivals—Israel and Sunni Arab states. Iran’s concerns are not limited to Israel. It also sees Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar as rivals. Qatar may be somewhat of an exception because of its recent relations with Turkey and Iran. For Iran, representing Islam is a crucial matter. Tehran believes these other states have usurped Iran’s claim to represent Islam.

 

You mentioned two primary objectives for Israel: first, the collapse of the regime; second, ensuring that if the regime survives, it becomes dependent on the US and Israel. What would Israel do if neither objective is achieved?

 

If neither objective is achieved, major geopolitical shifts are very likely. As I mentioned earlier, the US supports four key regional states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel. For this reason, Israel does not want a powerful adversary capable of posing a direct military threat. In the future, Turkey could also become such a threat. Ideally, Israel would prefer Iran to transform into something similar to Saudi Arabia or Jordan in terms of political alignment. Iran managed to survive a similar crisis in 2017. If Israel’s objectives are not achieved this time, its regional strategic significance may decline, and alternative security arrangements might emerge. Ultimately, I believe the Iranian regime expects either capitulation or collapse.

 

Since the killing of Jina Amini, a Kurdish and broader Iranian opposition movement has remained active. What role might they play now?

 

The Kurds in Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat) face both a historic opportunity and a highly challenging process. Recently, Kurdish groups formed an alliance, which is extremely significant. Each party has its own experience and achievements. If they manage to combine their strengths effectively, they could establish self-administration in the event of the regime’s collapse. If the regime does not collapse but loses significant power, negotiations could begin. This could open the door to autonomy or even a confederal political structure. However, one major challenge is that Kurds are the only group with such a level of organization, and 10 million people cannot manage such a vast region alone. Nevertheless, Kurdish movements have important experience from Rojava and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Başûr).

 

Could you explain these opportunities in more detail?

 

Today a Kurmanji-speaking Kurd in Urmia has a stronger connection with Kelhuris in Kermanshah and Ilam than Kurds in Duhok and Sulaymaniyah did thirty years ago. This shows that Kurdish society has made significant progress. Across the Middle East, Kurdish political awareness is now quite high. In fact, public awareness sometimes surpasses that of political parties. If political actors want legitimacy among the people, they must develop policies that match this level of awareness. However, when speaking about 'the four parts of Kurdistan', especially in Rojhilat, political movements must be extremely careful, because these areas are not inhabited only by Kurds. If Kurdish movements act irresponsibly, conflicts could also arise in regions with Azeri populations.

 

Kurds and other communities are calling for democratization and self-determination in Iran. If Tehran engaged in negotiations with these groups, would a solution become more likely?

 

There is also a serious risk that if Israeli and US attacks stop, the Iranian regime could carry out large-scale reprisals against the Kurdish population. Within a week, the situation will likely become clearer. During the war against ISIS, Kurdish forces already functioned almost like a state actor. If the Iranian regime wanted negotiations tomorrow, there are five Kurdish political parties that could represent the Kurdish side. At the same time, Kurdish armed forces are also prepared for conflict. Kurds are not dependent on either the United States or Israel. Kurdish leaders have stated that if they are to obtain their rights, they will demand them directly from Tehran. For 47 years, Kurdish movements have been struggling against this regime and have developed significant political experience.

 

Finally, what kind of future awaits the Kurds in a Middle East where borders may be redrawn?

 

For many years, Kurdish politics followed a traditional pattern—for example, after the execution of Sheikh Said (Sheikh Said was a Kurdish leader who was executed by Turkish Goverment in 1925), society mourned but lacked strategic change. Today, however, Kurdish movements are attempting to challenge the geopolitical strategies of major powers such as the United States. Turkey also plays a critical role, as it hosts the largest Kurdish population. For the first time, influenced by the political thought of Abdullah Öcalan, Kurdish movements are both demanding their rights and attempting to counter the strategies imposed by regional states. Öcalan challenged the existing order and promoted a different political approach. Kurds today are trying to transform the political framework imposed upon them. This includes the concept known as the 'brotherhood of peoples.' Even Masoud Barzani likely supports the realization of this idea. After all, Kurdish society cannot afford endless conflict with neighboring Arab populations. Cities such as Erbil and Baghdad themselves demonstrate the region’s ethnic diversity. Kurdistan is no longer a land inhabited solely by Kurds. Therefore, the future must be built on coexistence among peoples. In the coming period—whether through confederalism or federalism—the essential issue will be maintaining a strong political stance. We are approaching a moment when freedom may be closer than ever before.

 

MA / Ceylan Sahinli